We show how to efficiently compile any given circuit C into a leakage-resistant circuit C such that any function on the wires of C that leaks information during a computation C(x) yields advantage in computing the product of | C| Ω(1) elements of the alternating group A u. In combination with new compression bounds for A u products, also obtained here, C withstands leakage from virtually any class of functions against which average-case lower bounds are known. This includes communication protocols, and AC 0 circuits augmented with few arbitrary symmetric gates. If NC 1 = TC 0 then the construction resists TC 0 leakage as well. We also conjecture that our construction resists NC 1 leakage. In addition, we extend the construction to the multi-query setting by relying on a simple secure hardware component.
INTRODUCTION
Motivated by successful attacks on cryptographic hardware, a recent, exciting line of work known as leakage-resistant cryptography considers models in which the adversary obtains more information from cryptographic algorithms than just their input/output behavior. A general goal in this * Supported by NSF grant CCF-0845003.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. area is to compile any circuit into a new "shielded" circuit such that any attack exploiting this extra information can in fact be carried out just using input/output access (and hence does not succeed under standard hardness assumptions). However, the seminal impossibility result on obfuscation [BGI+01] implies that one cannot shield circuits against an attack that obtains just one extra bit of information about the circuit, if this bit is computed as an arbitrary efficient leakage function of the wires of the circuit. More specifically it is sufficient that the leakage function is powerful enough to evaluate the shielded circuit on its own description. Still, this negative result does not necessarily hinder the scope of a theoretical study of leakage-resistant cryptography, because in practice this extra information is quite difficult to obtain and is typically limited to some simple-tocompute functions such as the Hamming weight of the bits carried on the wires. Thus, it makes sense to focus our attention on attacks where the extra information is obtained from the circuit by evaluating a computationally restricted leakage function.
One line of works considers leakage functions that operate on disjoint sets of the wires of the circuit, where the sets are chosen by the compiler (as opposed to the adversary). This setting has become known as the "only computation leaks" model, after Micali and Reyzin [MR04] . Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner in [ISW03] allow the leakage function to output projections of few of (the values carried on) the wires in each set. Their result is greatly generalized by a series of works [GR10, JV10, DF12, GR12] culminating in the construction by Goldwasser and Rothblum [GR12] which allows any arbitrary function of the sets, as long as the function has bounded output length.
In a different direction, Faust et al. [FRR+10] allow leakage functions that are computable by small, bounded-depth circuits with And, Or, and Not gates (AC 0 ). In contrast to the previous setting, here the leakage function accesses all wires simultaneously. In the case of an unbounded number of queries from the adversary -so-called "continual leakage" -the compiled circuits in [FRR+10] , unlike [ISW03, GR12] , utilize a secure hardware component. The latter is a simple gadget to which the leakage function does not have access. This use of secure hardware was removed recently by Rothblum [Rot12] at the expense of introducing a computational assumption.
In this work we present a new construction which significantly extends both lines of work, except that in the case of an unbounded number of queries we have to rely on a secure hardware component, similarly to [FRR+10] .
Our results
We show how to efficiently compile any given circuit C into a leakage-resistant circuit C such that any function on the wires of C that leaks information during some computation C(x) yields advantage in computing iterated group products over the alternating group Au, which recall is the group of even permutations of a set of size u. (For background on this group, see e.g. [KS04, §4.3] .)
For simplicity, we first focus on the setting where the adversary makes a single query to the circuit, and we do not use any secure hardware. Defined next, our compiler is randomized and takes two inputs: a circuit C : {0,
n , and a value k ∈ {0, 1} n for C's second input. It outputs a circuit C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n that is functionally equivalent to C(·, k) (we choose to omit a k subscript though C depends on k). The only parts of C that depend on k and the random coins are the values of its constant gates; the rest is determined by C. The adversary depends on C and thus knows everything about C except the values of certain constant gates. The adversary then selects both an input x to the circuit and a leakage function to be evaluated on the wires of the circuit. The requirement that the adversary "learns nothing" from the output of the leakage function is formalized by providing an efficient simulator S. S sees only the input x and output C(x) of the circuit, as well as the circuit C which is assumed to be public, and produces a set of wire values that is indistinguishable from the real set of wire values by the leakage function. Throughout the paper we will use |C| to denote the number of wires in a circuit C, which is the input length of the leakage functions.
n and a string k ∈ {0, 1} n . For a set of functions L, Comp is an (L, )-leakage-secure compiler if the following properties hold.
1. (Structure.) For every C and k, Comp(C, k) outputs a circuit C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n which is completely determined by C except for the values of its constant gates.
2. (Correctness.) For every C and k and every x ∈ {0, 1} n , C(x) = C(x, k) with probability 1 over the choice of
3. (Security.) There exists a randomized polynomial-time algorithm S such that for every C and k, every x ∈ {0, 1} n , and every ∈ L with domain {0, 1} | C| :
where W ∈ {0, 1} | C| denotes the values carried by the wires of C(x), and the statistical distance Δ is over the choice of C ← Comp(C, k) and the random coins of S.
The security of our construction is proved against leakage classes L for which iterated products over A u are hard in the following sense. As discussed later, we exploit specific properties of A u. However, when possible we present things over any group G.
Definition 2. Let G be a group (whose operation is written multiplicatively). For α ∈ G and t ∈ N, let D α denote the uniform distribution over
for every α ∈ G and every ∈ L with domain G t .
We will use the notation Dα, U G t throughout the paper. Our security reductions are computable by simple, local (a.k.a. NC 0 ) functions.
as a function of t, we simply say local. For a set of functions L, the d-local extension of L is the set of all functions (f (·)) where ∈ L and f is a d-local function.
Note that 1-local functions are also known as projections. Our compiler is given by the following main theorem. 
For every set of functions L and every
Note that making t smaller reduces the size overhead of C, but that larger values of t are necessary to find rich classes L that are fooled by G t . To instantiate our construction we prove in §3 that (A u) t fools a number of well-studied classes of functions (with parameters polynomially related to t). For all these results we can and will choose u = 5. One class is that of numberon-forehead multiparty protocols introduced by Chandra, Furst, and Lipton [CFL83] , which are formally defined in §3.1; here our result relies on the long-standing lower bound by Babai, Nisan, and Szegedy [BNS92] , whose proof is increasingly streamlined in [CT93, Raz00, VW08] . Another is the class AC 0 of bounded-depth And/Or/Not circuits augmented with few gates computing arbitrary symmetric functions, such as parity and majority. This is the richest circuit class for which super-polynomial average-case lower bounds are known [Vio07] . In fact, one can allow few gates whose local extension has low number-on-forehead communication under any partition, such as polynomial threshold functions [Nis93, Vio11] . We also consider the class TC 0 of boundeddepth circuits of majority gates; for this class no lower bound is known, and our results rely on the standard complexity assumption TC 0 = NC 1 . The following theorem summarizes the results above. These results can also be seen as giving compression bounds, similar to the work of Dubrov and Ishai [DI06] (see also [HN10, Dru12] and others). In fact, we essentially recover for A 5-products the parameters of the [DI06] compression bound against AC 0 (building on their result), and also prove compression bounds against stronger classes. 
and t δ bits of output, for any δ < 1; = 2
The straightforward combination of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 gives an (L, )-secure compiler for the circuit classes listed in items 2-4 of the latter, choosing t = |C| for the following corollary. The combination is less straightforward for protocols, which are not closed under composition with arbitrary local functions. We obtain item 1 of the following corollary by showing (in §4) that the local extension of a number-inhand protocol is computable by a number-on-forehead protocol. 
L = AC 0 circuits with depth
and | C| δ/3 bits of output, for any δ < 1;
In particular, our construction resists leakage from functions such as parity, majority, inner product, and polynomial thresholds. Besides being well-studied, these functions break most previous constructions. For example, inner product breaks [DF12, GR12] , and parity breaks [ISW03, FRR+10, Rot12] . Also, small TC 0 circuits can be shown to break at least one instantiation of the construction [JV10] using the fact that such circuits may compute division, cf. [All01] . In fact, we are only aware of one construction that is not easily broken in TC 0 . This is the construction [GR10] which relies on the Decisional-Diffie-Hellman assumption. It is broken by any leakage function that can decrypt a certain public-key cryptosystem based on it, but decryption here involves modular exponentiation (to a poly-length exponent); whether this is doable in small depth is an open problem.
Finally, note that the last item shows that we recover the security of [FRR+10] against AC 0 leakage functions.
Security against NC 1 .
We conjecture that our construction is secure even against leakage from functions computable in NC 1 , and we now discuss the motivation for this conjecture.
Obviously (A u) t does not fool NC 1 circuits of size poly(t) when u = O(1), for such circuits can simply compute the product. However it is not clear how such a computation would go when u = ω(1), and in fact Cook and McKenzie [CM87] show that computing the product of n given permutations of a set of n elements is complete for L=Space(log n). At first glance this may seem to be exactly what we need to obtain NC 1 security (under the assumption NC 1 = L), because indeed the heart of Theorem 1.2 is the construction due to Barrington [Bar89] that establishes the NC 1 -completeness of computing A 5-products.
However, a closer inspection reveals that we require more. What we need is that, for every α ∈ A n, the following promise problem is hard for NC 1 circuits of size poly(n).
Definition 4. Fix an element α ∈ A n. Then, the α-product problem is to decide, given a tuple in (A n) n that is guaranteed to have product either α or identity, which product it has.
The Cook-McKenzie construction can be used to show that for some α ∈ A n the α-product problem is hard for
(This is not obvious, and was pointed out to us by Eric Allender and V. Arvind in personal communication.) However it is not clear if it can be used to show this for every α. Note that if NC 1 cannot decide the α-product problem for every α, then the random-self reducibility of group products (cf. Lemma 3.2) allows one to prove that (A n) n n −ω(1) -fools NC 1 , which is sufficient for our construction.
Multiple queries.
We also consider the setting in which the adversary makes multiple, adaptive queries to the circuit C. As in the previous setting, each query consists of both an input to the circuit and a leakage function. The adversary is assumed to be computationally unbounded, except for the restriction on the leakage functions. We defer to the full version of this paper the formal definition of security in this setting, but it is a natural extension of Definition 1.
If the number of queries q is fixed in advance and known to the compiler, then our construction in Theorem 1.1 can be extended with little difficulty to this setting. The resulting construction increases the size of C by a factor of O(q) and likewise the security degrades by a factor of q (details omitted).
When the number of queries q is not a priori bounded, we adopt the approach of [FRR+10] and augment C with a socalled secure hardware component. In our construction, this component is a randomized, inputless gate that on each execution outputs a sample from D id , where id denotes the identity element of A 5. We refer to such gates as D id -gates, and any circuit that contains one as a D id -circuit. The complexity of this component is comparable to the one in [FRR+10] which outputs a uniform bit vector with parity 0. (Secure hardware components are also used in [GR10, JV10] , but there the components are not inputless and furthermore the distribution sampled is significantly more complex.)
To prove security in this setting, a slightly stronger property is required of (A 5) t than what is given by Theorem 1.2. Specifically we require that, for every ∈ L and every ∈ L that is chosen adaptively based on the output of , the distribution ( (x), (x)) when x ← Dα has statistical distance ≤ from the corresponding distribution when x ← U G t . We show that each of the classes L listed in Theorem 1.2 has this property; the only difference is that for AC 0 circuits with symmetric gates, we restrict the output length to O(log 2 t). We defer the details to the full version of this paper, and simply state our result for multiple queries. 
and
Organization.
In §2 we describe our construction and prove the key lemma that enables the proof of Theorem 1.1. In §3 we show that number-on-forehead protocols are fooled by (A 5) t , proving part 1 of Theorem 1.2. In §4 we prove Theorem 1.1 (and Corollary 1.3).
THE CONSTRUCTION
In this section we describe our main construction. Our compiler uses the general framework of the works [ISW03, FRR+10] . In this framework, to every wire of C there corresponds in the compiled circuit C a "bundle" of wires which encode the same information. (In [ISW03, FRR+10 ] a bit b is encoded by a bundle x whose parity is b.) One then uses appropriate gadgets to simulate the computation of C on the bundles. Note the distinction between gates and gadgets in C: gadgets operate on bundles of wires, and are composed of gates that operate on individual wires.
The main differences between our construction and the ones in [ISW03, FRR+10] are in the encoding and in the gadgets. A side-benefit of our gadgets is that they allow for a more modular construction yielding an arguably more intuitive proof of security. Next we describe our encoding, our gadgets, and the proof of security. But first we make some remarks on the group used throughout.
The choice of the group.
This work exploits 3 properties of the alternating group A 5.
(i) It fools various classes in the sense of Definition 2 (see Theorem 1.2). We show that this is implied by the fact that every element of A 5 is a commutator; such groups are known as perfect [HP89] .
(ii) It supports Barrington's encoding of NC 1 computation [Bar89] , which we use in the construction of the nand gadget below. (This is implied by the group being non-solvable, which in turn is implied by it being perfect.) (iii) It has specific elements that support a more efficient encoding of certain functions such as parity, improving on (ii). This is used in Theorem 1.2 to obtain improved parameters and in particular to match the parameters of the previous compression bound in [DI06] .
We point out that (i) is not implied by (ii). Indeed, for (ii) the group S 5 is typically chosen. However (S5) t does not even (1/2)-fool the 1-local extension of parity, which can compute the sign of the product permutation. This is because the sign of D α always equals the sign of α, whereas the sign of U (S 5 ) t is equidistributed over {−1, 1}.
The group encoding.
We encode a bit b ∈ {0, 1} by a tuple of elements over a group G as follows. Let id denote G's identity element, and
As in [Bar89] , we can use any α for which there exists an element β ∈ G such that α, β, and αβα −1 β −1 are in the same conjugacy class. Equivalently, there must exist three elements β, γ, ρ ∈ G such that the following two equations hold.
For G = A5 and using cycle notation, these values can be set as follows: α = (12345), β = ρ = (14235), γ = (12354).
For convenience we present the construction over G as opposed to {0, 1} and using gates for group multiplication and inversion. It is straightforward to obtain a construction over {0, 1} and any standard basis by implementing group operations via bit operations.
The nand gadget.
We assume without loss of generality that C, the circuit input to the compiler, contains only fan-in-2 gates that compute the Nand function. We now describe the nand gadget that simulates each Nand gate in C. Given as input two bundles x, y ∈ G t with products in {id, α}, the nand gadget outputs a bundle z ∈ G t that encodes the Nand of x and y, i.e., that satisfies:
The output bundle z ∈ G t is computed by the following steps. · y 1, y2, 
Set y ← (γ
(This maintains i zi ∈ {id, α} but if the product in step 4 was α it is now id, and vice versa.) 6. Compute and output z ∈ G t by multiplying consecutive groups of 4 elements in z:
From the equations (1) it can be verified that (2) is satisfied.
Warm-up for the random gadget.
The second and last gadget that we need is called random and is essentially applied to every bundle in C that corresponds to a wire in C. This gadget has to satisfy two properties. First we need that on input x ∈ G t , the random gadget outputs a bundle z ∈ G t that is distributed uniformly over {z ∈ G t | i zi = i xi}. This is necessary both for the correctness and security of the construction. The second property, necessary only for the security, is that given an input-output pair (x, z) for this gadget, we should be able to compute locally a distribution on the gadget's wires that is indistinguishable from the real distribution. (This allows us to replace the real distribution on the wires of C with the one in which each random gadget is reconstructed. Then we can replace each bundle of wires in C with a uniform bundle, which the simulator can do by itself, and blame any inconsistency on the reconstructor.) This property is called local reconstructibility and is a variant of the one in [FRR+10] .
Before describing our gadget, we note that there is a simple gadget that satisfies the first property but not the second. Namely, choose r 1, . . . , rt−1 ∈ G uniformly at random, and output
Indeed, this basic re-randomization technique has been used to great effect in a number of works, e.g. [Kil88, FKN94, AIK06, GGH+08, AAW10]. However, this simple gadget does not satisfy local reconstructibility. One reason is that given x, z, one can come up with values for the r i that are consistent with each gate in the circuit if and only if x i = zi. However, the latter is an NC 1 -hard question, whereas consistency of the r may be checked by, say, a DNF.
By contrast, one feature of our gadget is that given x, z one can produce consistent values for the wires even if x i = zi. The catch is that in the latter case the values of certain constant gates are not chosen as in the correct implementation, but the leakage functions will not be able to distinguish this.
The random gadget.
We now describe our gadget. The computation corresponds to replacing each pair (r i, r
and then computing the multiplications in a specific order.
First, choose R (1) , . . . ,
for 1 < i ≤ t. In the single-query setting, we think of Comp choosing these values and hardwiring them into C; in the multi-query setting, each pair (R (i−1) , L (i) ) will be output by a secure hardware component. We will drop the superscripts on R and L when they are clear from context. Then we define the output z ∈ G t as follows.
Clearly this z has the correct distribution. We perform each iterated multiplication by a depth-O(t) tree of fan-in-2 multiplication gates in a specific way, described now. For z 1, the product is computed in the straightforward way from left to right by a depth-t tree that computes each prefix product
. . , t in order, and outputs z1 := λt. The product for z t is computed in the straightforward way from left to right as well. Now let 1 < i < t. The product for z i is computed by a depth-2t tree that multiplies "from the inside out". That is, it computes in order a sequence λ 1, . . . , λ2t−1 defined by λ 1 := Lt · xi and recursively for j = 1, . . . , t − 1 by
and then outputs zi := λ2t−1 · Rt.
By way of illustration, when t = 3 the sequence is computed as follows.
It is interesting to note that that the size overhead of O(t 2 ) in our construction comes from the fact that the random gadget has this size, and not from the nand gadget which has size O(t). This is in contrast to previous constructions using the parity encoding (e.g. [ISW03, FRR+10] ), for which it is not known how to compute Nand with this size. Improving the O(t 2 ) overhead in any of these constructions, including ours, is an interesting open problem.
The following key lemma in this work shows that the random gadget is locally reconstructible. We say that x, z ∈ G t are plausible if it is possible for random(x) to output z, i. 
then some 1-local extension of is not -fooled by G, i.e., there is a g ∈ G and a 1-local function f :
Proof. We first describe an alternate procedure for generating Wx→z. Fix any plausible x, z ∈ G t . For the tree computing z 1, choose each λj uniformly at random for j = 1, . . . , t − 1, and compute each R 
is uniform for 1 ≤ j < t, and
takes the unique consistent value. This computation is sequential, due to the selection of L (i) based on R (i−1) in step 1. This selection is there to ensure condition (4). However by dropping this condition, we can break the dependencies between multiplication trees and give a local reconstructor. Namely, we define R random(x, z) to be the above computation except that L (i) is chosen uniformly at random in step 1. Note that R random is a distribution on 1-local functions.
To prove the lemma, we define a set of hybrid distributions H m on the wires of random for m = 1, . . . , t − 1. Fix any plausible x, z ∈ G t . In Hm, the wires in the tree computing z i for i ≤ m are chosen as in Wx→z, and for i > m the wires are chosen as in R random(x, z). Then, we have H1 ≡ R random(x, z) and Ht−1 ≡ Wx→z (note that the first and last trees are distributed identically in W x→z and Rrandom(x, z)). Thus if there is a function such that
Now let g ∈ G be the fixed value (depending on x, z) such that j R (m−1) j = g with probability 1 in both Hm and Hm−1. Thus in Hm−1 (resp. Hm), L (m) is distributed according to U G t (resp. D g −1 ). (Note that this g is arbitrary, i.e. not only α or id, and hence we are using the full generality of Definition 2.) Because H m−1 and Hm differ only in the tree computing z m, and because the distribution on these wires is independent of all other wires when x and z are fixed, by an averaging argument we can fix all wires outside this tree while preserving (6). Then given a vector v ∈ G t distributed according to either 
ON COMPRESSING GROUP PRODUCTS
In this section we show that (A5) t fools number-on-forehead communication protocols, proving part 1 of Theorem 1.2. The proofs of parts 2-4 are deferred to the full version of this paper. We start by recalling a number of facts related to groups and computation.
First, it will be convenient later to prove that (D α) and (D id ) are close for every α ∈ G, ∈ L, and we observe that this is sufficient.
We will also make use of the random self-reducibility of the distributions D α.
Lemma 3.2. There exists a distribution on 1-local functions
Proof. R chooses r1, . . . , rt−1 ∈ G uniformly at random, and outputs (x 1 · r1, r
Recall the following standard terminology: α is an involution if α = α −1 , and α is the commutator of β and 
. , fm(·)).
The following two lemmas allow certain functions to be more efficiently α-computed. These can be compared with the works by Cai and Lipton [CL94] and Cleve [Cle91] which give increasingly efficient versions of Barrington's construction (here efficiency is measured in the length of M 's output). Our construction is simpler than the ones given in these works, but also less general.
Lemma 3.4. For every involution α ∈ A 5, the following holds.
There is a 1-local function
Proof. For the first item: given input x ∈ {0, 1} n , output y ∈ (A 5) n such that yi = α x i . The correctness of this construction, as well as the second item, follows from the isomorphism between the group {0, 1} (under ⊕) and the subgroup {id, α} ⊂ A 5.
For the next lemma, note that because every k-cycle can be written as a product of k − 1 transpositions by
every element of A5 is either a 3-cycle, a 5-cycle, the product of two disjoint transpositions, or the identity. 
Multi-party protocols
In this section we consider functions computable by a multi-party communication protocol in the "number on forehead" model [CFL83] , defined as follows. A protocol P with n-bit inputs consists of k = k(n) parties, each with unlimited computational power. The input x ∈ {0, 1} kn is partitioned into k blocks, and party i sees all input bits except those in the ith block. The parties communicate in the broadcast model, so every bit sent is seen by all parties. The (m = m(n))-bit output of P is defined to be the final m bits that are broadcast, and the cost of P is the total number of bits broadcast by all parties. When P 's input comes from a group G, we assume some canonical representation of G's elements as (log |G|)-bit strings.
We prove the following compression bound for such protocols. We prove this theorem by combining an efficient translation from bits to group products with the following lower bound. Define the following function GIP n,k : {0, 1} nk → {0, 1}, known as the generalized inner-product function.
Then we have the following lemma, originally due to Babai, Nisan, and Szegedy [BNS92] and with increasingly streamlined proofs in [CT93, Raz00, VW08] .
Lemma 3.7 ([BNS92]).
There is a partition of the inputs to GIP n,k into k blocks such that for every protocol P : {0, 1}
nk → {0, 1} with k parties that communicates at most c bits,
We give the following translation to bits from group products.
be the function guaranteed by Theorem 3.3 that α-computes the k-wise AND of its input. Then letting
α-computes GIP n,k by the second item of Lemma 3.4. If α is not an involution, let β, γ ∈ A 5 be the involutions guaranteed by Lemma 3.5 such that α = βγβγ (note that β = β −1 and γ = γ −1 ). Then let M instead β-compute the AND of its input, and compute M as
We now give the proof of Theorem 3.6.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. For an appropriate n = Ω(t/k 2 ), let M : {0, 1} n·k → (A5) t be the 1-local function guaranteed by Lemma 3.8 that α-computes GIP n,k . Consider the partition on the t elements of the input from (A 5) t that is induced by M from the partition on GIP n,k guaranteed by Lemma 3.7.
Assume for contradiction that some protocol on this partition is not -fooled. Without loss of generality the protocol outputs 1 bit. (The last player can simulate whatever set maximizes the statistical distance of the multi-bit protocol output distributions.) By Lemma 3.1, there is an α ∈ A 5 and a protocol P : (A5) t → {0, 1} with k parties communi-
for a suitable constant β. By combining the P with M we now give a distribution on protocols P : {0, 1} n·k → {0, 1} for GIP n,k with the same number of parties, the same communication, and the same advantage up to the constant β. This contradicts Lemma 3.7.
On input x, each party in P first computes the portion of y := M (x) ∈ (A 5) t that depends on the input bits it can see; this is done with no communication as M is 1-local. Next each party computes the portion of z := (y 1 · r1, r
t−1 · yt) that depends on the input bits it can see, again with no communication. (r is a public random string.) Finally the parties compute and output P (z) using the protocol P .
Note for every x such that GIP n,k (x) = 1 (resp. GIP n,k (x) = 0), z is distributed according to D α (resp. D id ) over the choice of r. The proof is now completed using the fact that Pr
PROOFS OF THM. 1.1 AND COR. 1.3
Proof of Theorem 1.1.
n and k ∈ {0, 1} n be the input to Comp. As described in §2, Comp constructs a circuit C by replacing each wire in C with a bundle of t wires, and replacing each gate in C with a set of gadgets. Specifically for each Nand gate in in C with two input wires and m output wires, C contains a nand gadget followed by m random gadgets in parallel (each of which takes as input the nand gadget's output).
In order for C(x) to map {0,
n to x ∈ (G t ) n as a first step, and decode z ∈ (G t ) n to z ∈ {0, 1} n as a final step. This is done in the following straightforward way. The input encoder sets each x i to be either (id, . . . , id) or (id, . . . , id, α) depending if x i = 0 or 1. The output decoder computes each product t j=1 (z i )j, and sets zi = 0 or 1 depending if this product is id or α. The decoder may use any correct multiplication tree, i.e. the specific tree used is not relevant to the proof of security.
The size/depth bounds of Comp are immediate. To prove that C is a correct circuit (i.e. that C(x) = C(x, k) for every x), one can apply an inductive argument to show that each bundle at the output of a random gadget correctly encodes the value of the corresponding wire in C, and thus the output decoder indeed produces C(x, k).
In the hybrid arguments below, we will crucially use the fact that each bundle of the secret state and each bundle at the output of a random gadget is uniform (over the random coins of Comp) subject to correctly encoding the corresponding wire of C.
On input (C, x, C(x)), the simulator S computes a distribution on the wires of C as follows.
First, S computes the wires for the encoder and decoder honestly. For the encoder this is straightforward. For the decoder, S chooses n vectors z i ∈ G t which are uniform conditioned on the correct product (determined by C(x)i), and then computes the wires for the multiplication trees honestly. These wires are distributed identically to the real distribution on C(x)'s wires and thus will not affect the hybrid arguments that follow, which is why these multiplication trees and the complexity of S for this step are not of interest.
Next, S chooses uniformly at random the values for each wire encoding the secret input k, as well as each connecting wire at the output of a random gate (except those which touch the output decoder and have already been chosen).
Next, for each nand gadget S computes values for its internal wires and for its output wires by simply evaluating the gadget. (Here we use the fact that the output of one nand gadget is never the input of another, so all nand input bundles have already been set.) Finally, S computes internal wire values for each random gadget using R random. Now let C ← Comp(C, k), and recall that W x denotes the real distribution on the wires of C(x). We define an intermediate distribution W x as follows: first draw a sample from Wx, and then recompute the internal wires of each random gadget from its input/output bundles using R random.
We now show that W x is indistinguishable (by L) from both Wx and S (C, x, C(x) ). Define some fixed ordering on the ≤ |C| random gadgets of C. Then by a hybrid argument, there is an m ≤ |C| and two distributions H and H , defined as follows, for which Δ( (H), (H )) > · (t − 1). H is defined by first drawing a sample from Wx, and then recomputing the internal wires of random gadgets 1, . . . , m from their input/output bundles; H is the same except only random gadgets 1, . . . , m − 1 are recomputed.
Now by an averaging argument, we can fix all wires in both H and H except those internal to the mth random gadget, obtaining a function (with domain G |random| ) in the 1-local extension of L. Then distinguishes the real wires of the mth random gadget from those computed by R random with advantage > · (t − 1). In combination with Lemma 2.1, this contradicts the claim's hypothesis. Define some fixed ordering on the ≤ |C| bundles of C that either encode a bit of the secret input k or are at the output of a random gadget but do not touch the output decoder. Then by a hybrid argument, there is an m ≤ |C| and two distributions H and H , defined as follows, for which Δ( (H), (H )) > . In H, bundles 1, . . . , m are uniformly random and bundles m + 1, . . . , |C| are random subject to correctly encoding the value of the corresponding wire in C; in H only bundles 1, . . . , m − 1 are uniformly random. In both, each nand's internal wires are computed using the gadget itself, and each random's internal wires are computed using R random.
Let g ∈ {id, α} be the value encoded by the mth bundle in W x (determined by C, k and x). Note that the mth bundle is necessarily the input of a nand gadget, and is either the output of a random gadget or a bundle encoding a bit of k. By an averaging argument, we can fix all wires in H and H while preserving Δ( (H), (H )) > , except for the following: the mth bundle, the internal and output wires of the nand gadget that it touches, the internal wires of the random gadgets that are adjacent to the output of this nand gadget, and the internal wires of the random gadget that outputs the mth bundle (if it exists).
Finally, a 4-local function can compute one of the two distributions from an input v ∈ G t distributed according to either U G t or Dg: it plugs v into the mth bundle and computes the (4-local) nand gadget and the (1-local) R random.
Finally, because Δ is a metric, these two claims give part 2 of the theorem.
